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ABSTRACT
For a large country like China, handling of intergovernmental fiscal relations must 
create compatible incentives to central and local governments. China initially created 
a fiscal management system characterized by tax sharing in 1994, basically meeting 
the needs of its socialist market economic system. Yet further improvements must be 
made to the assignment of administrative authority and expenditure responsibilities, 
revenue allocation and the fiscal transfer payment system. This paper is based on the 
author’s previous research and the recent situation of adjustment in China’s intergov-
ernmental fiscal relations. The paper examines the problems of local-central fiscal re-
lations: insufficient alignment between fiscal revenues and administrative authority; 
uncertainty of sharing the revenue from income tax and value-added tax; imperfect 
tax rebate and transfer payment system. Concludes that uncertainties of local fiscal 
resources inevitably affected the behavior of local governments. The paper describes 
the land sales revenues of local government as the example how the interplay inter-
governmental fiscal relations with other systems threatens socio-economic sustain-
ability of China. The following measures in tax reforming are suggested: increasing 
the share of local governments in VAT distribution; reducing the property tax rates; 
canceling tax rebates; endowing local governments with certain taxing authority, in-
cluding legislation and tax rate adjustment. In handling intergovernmental fiscal rela-
tions, great attention must be paid to the system’s stability to give play to its function 
of incentives and restraints
KEYWORDS
Fiscal management, intergovernmental fiscal relations, fiscal system, sharing tax rev-
enue 
HIGHLIGHTS
1. China must create a hierarchical fiscal management system in line with its modern 
fiscal system and further standardize the division between administrative authority 
and expenditure responsibilities
2. China should formalize a fiscal transfer payment system, and develop a hierarchi-
cal fiscal management system encompassing the sharing of tax, rents and profits
ПРОБЛЕМЫ МЕЖБЮДЖЕТНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ 
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОГО И МЕСТНОГО УРОВНЕЙ ВЛАСТИ В КИТАЕ
Ян Чжиюн
Национальная академия экономической стратегии  
Китайской академии социальных наук, г. Пекин, Китай
АННОТАЦИЯ 
Межбюджетные отношения в таких крупных странах как Китай должны быть 
разработаны таким образом, чтобы создавать совместимые стимулы для цен-
тральных и местных органов власти. Система фискального управления с рас-
пределением налогов, созданная в Китае в 1994 г., в основном удовлетворяла 
потребности социалистической рыночной экономической системы страны. 
Тем не менее, существует необходимость совершенствования административ-
93
ISSN 2412-8872 Journal of Tax Reform, 2017, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 92–102
ных полномочий и расходных обязательств различных уровней власти, а также 
внесения изменений в распределение доходов и систему межбюджетных транс-
фертов. Статья базируется на предыдущих исследованиях автора и учитывает 
недавнюю корректировку сферы межбюджетных отношений в Китае. В ней рас-
сматриваются такие проблемы фискальных отношений между центральным и 
местным уровнями власти как недостаточное согласование между налоговыми 
поступлениями и административными полномочиями; неопределенность рас-
пределения доходов от подоходного налога и налога на добавленную стоимость; 
несовершенство налоговых скидок и межбюджетных трансфертов. Делается вы-
вод, что неопределенность объема доходов местных бюджетов неизбежно влия-
ет на поведение местных органов власти. На примере получения доходов от про-
дажи земли местными органами власти показано, что проблемы межбюджетных 
отношений во взаимосвязи с другими системами угрожают социально-экономи-
ческой устойчивости Китая. Предлагаются следующие направления налоговых 
реформ: увеличение доли налога на добавленную стоимость распределяемого 
в доходы местных бюджетов; снижение ставок налога на имущество; отмена на-
логовых скидок; предоставление местным органам власти определенных нало-
говых полномочий, включая возможность изменять налоговое законодательство 
и корректировать налоговые ставки. Указывается, что при реформировании 
межбюджетных отношений необходимо обеспечить стабильность фискальной 
системы, чтобы усилить ее стимулирующую и регулирующую роль
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Фискальный менеджмент, межбюджетные отношения, фискальная система, 
распределение налоговых доходов
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. В Китае должна быть создана система фискального управления соответству-
ющая современной фискальной системе страны и продолжена стандартизация 
распределения административных и расходных полномочий различных уров-
ней власти
2. Система межбюджетных трансфертов в Китае должна быть формализована, а 
иерархическая система финансового управления должна включать распределе-
ние между бюджетами налогов, арендной платой и прибылью
Introduction
The Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
CPC Central Committee in 2013 set the 
goal of China’s fiscal reform to establish a 
modern fiscal system. “Establishing a sys-
tem whereby authority of office matches 
responsibility of expenditure” is one of the 
three major priorities. On June 30, 2014, 
the Political Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee deliberated and adopted the 
Plan for Deepening Overall Reform of the Fis-
cal and Tax Systems, which calls for adjust-
ments to local-central fiscal relations. Spe-
cifically, the reform should rationalize the 
allocation of local-central fiscal revenues 
in line with expenditure responsibilities. 
The recognition of the importance of 
a well-designed and comprehensive sys-
tem of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
has the deep roots in the local government 
economics and fiscal decentralisation liter-
ature [1–7]. There are numerous academic 
research in the field of fiscal decentraliza-
tion in China which reflect the processes, 
characteristics, and measurements of fiscal 
decentralization. See for example [8–11].
In adjusting local-central fiscal re-
lations, the ultimate goal is to create a 
hierarchical fiscal management system 
[12–14]. China’s tax sharing reform in 1994 
laid out the basic framework for today’s 
local-central fiscal relations and was car-
ried out in tandem with tax reform and 
the creation of a tax collection and man-
agement system. Over the past two de-
cades, China’s fiscal prowess grew to 
strength steadily, with fiscal revenue as a 
percentage in GDP up from around 10 % 
to 22.5 % in 20151. Strong fiscal resources 
1 According to the final accounts of national 
general public budget revenue, in 2015, China’s 
fiscal revenue amounted to 15.223 trillion yuan 
and GDP totaled 67.67 trillion yuan.
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empowered government regulation in a 
market-based economy. Nevertheless, the 
legacy problems under this system must 
be addressed through further reforms2.
Problems  
of local-central fiscal relations
Negative incentives from alignment 
between fiscal revenues and administra-
tive authority. Before 1994, local-central 
fiscal relations were subject to the princi-
ple of alignment between fiscal power and 
administrative authority. Under this prin-
ciple, prosperous regions were incentiv-
ized to make most of local fiscal resources. 
However, in less developed regions, it 
was difficult for local governments to col-
lect sufficient revenues to finance a wide 
range of public services. To address this 
dilemma, the Report of the 17th CPC Nation-
al Congress called for “improving the fiscal 
and taxation systems so that the financial 
resources of governments are in line with 
their respective responsibilities” in 2007. 
By matching fiscal revenues with expen-
diture responsibilities, the central govern-
ment ensured adequate fiscal resources 
for less developed regions, particularly 
counties and townships. However, due to 
their unfavorable position in revenue allo-
cation under the new system, prosperous 
regions were not fully incentivized to ex-
plore local fiscal resources essential to the 
provision of public services.
Negative Incentives from the Uncer-
tainty of Revenue Sharing. Policy stabil-
ity is the foundation for hierarchical fiscal 
management system. In 1994, personal 
income tax was a local tax. After the in-
come tax sharing reform in 2002, personal 
income tax and corporate income tax be-
came shared taxes between local and cen-
tral governments. The progress is that for 
many enterprises, payment of income tax 
is no longer subject to their administrative 
affiliation to the central or local govern-
ment. However, a few SOEs under the 
central government are exempted from 
the sharing of income tax. Furthermore, 
2 Some papers such as the paper by Lou Jiwei 
also reflected China’s intergovernmental fiscal re-
lations, but the choice of reform options in this 
paper is much different by comparison [15].
the sharing of income tax is subject to 
a fixed base. In this sense, reform of the 
shared corporate income tax is incom-
plete. Personal income tax, which would 
be otherwise a central tax and whose 
amount of revenue was limited, was left 
to local governments. After personal in-
come tax developed into a major source 
of tax revenue, turning it into a shared tax 
inevitably dampened local enthusiasm for 
tax collection. Business tax, which used to 
be the most important source of revenue 
for local governments, is integrated into 
value-added tax (VAT) with the imple-
mentation of the reform of replacing busi-
ness tax with VAT. Although VAT rev-
enues are shared evenly between central 
and local governments, the reform took a 
toll on local fiscal resources. As a result, 
the central government returned a surplus 
of 178 billion yuan to local governments 
to ease local fiscal gaps in 2016. However, 
the uncertainties of local fiscal resources 
inevitably affected the behavior of local 
governments.
Negative incentives from imperfect 
tax rebate and transfer payment system. 
China’s fiscal reform of 1994 determined 
the ratio of central-local fiscal revenue 
to be 6:4, the ratio of central-local fiscal 
expenditure to be 4:6, and the return of 
20 % fiscal revenues from central to local 
governments. This target has never been 
achieved. A major proportion of local 
general public budgetary expenditure has 
been funded by the central government. 
Despite a slight decrease in recent years, 
the tax rebate and transfer payment made 
by the central government to local govern-
ments amounted to 5 509.751 billion yuan, 
accounting for 36.65 % of the 15.03 trillion 
yuan local general public budgetary ex-
penditure3. Tremendous tax rebates and 
transfer payments led to inefficiencies and 
overreliance on the central government.
The unreasonable structure of transfer 
payments also posed a challenge to the 
creation of a hierarchical fiscal system. In 
3 Such data and the fiscal data of 2015 in 
the following paragraph are from “National Fis-
cal Final Accounts” formulated by the Ministry 
of Finance (Available at: http://yss.mof.gov.
cn/2015js/index.html).
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2015, central-local tax rebates amounted 
to 501.886 billion yuan, general transfer 
payments reached 2 845.502 billion yuan, 
and special transfer payments totaled 
2 162.363 billion yuan, accounting for 
9.11 %, 51.64 % and 39.25 % respectively of 
the total amount of tax rebates and trans-
fer payments. Initially intended as a tem-
porary arrangement, tax rebates lasted for 
more than 20 years. General transfer pay-
ments, which account for more than 50 % 
of the total, have many characteristics of 
special transfer payments. Many items of 
general transfer payments are associated 
with specific policy objectives, including 
transfer payments for remote and less de-
veloped regions, tax reform for finished 
oil products, grassroots public security 
funding, basic pension, as well as medical 
insurance. 
Many items of balancing transfer pay-
ment that have nothing to do with specific 
local policy objectives also have the nature 
of special transfer payments. For instance, 
transfer payments are made to assist eco-
logical function areas, grain-producing 
counties, county-level basic fiscal security, 
resource-depleted cities, urban and rural 
compulsory education, and integrated 
rural reform. A few items of transfer pay-
ments (such as intergovernmental settle-
ment allowance) are legacies of an obsolete 
system. Due to the lack of transparency in 
decision-making, the special transfer pay-
ment system is also under a great deal of 
criticism and needs further reform.
Interplay with other systems threat-
ens socio-economic sustainability. In-
tergovernmental fiscal relations are the 
weathervane of China’s socio-economic 
development. This system laid the foun-
dation for China’s socio-economic devel-
opment over the past two decades. In the 
meantime, the relative central-local fiscal 
power changed as well. Compounded by 
other systems, the inherent defect of this 
system poses grave challenges to sustain-
able socio-economic development in the 
future. Local governments have an insa-
tiable demand for revenues to keep up 
with growing expenditures. Their own-
ership of land means that revenues can 
be earned from selling land to real estate 
developers. Thanks to China’s booming 
housing market, land sales revenues ac-
count for staggering proportions of local 
government coffers. However, reliance of 
fiscal revenue on the sales of government-
owned land is unsustainable. Further, it 
inflates property prices and distorts the 
ratio of house price to income. The inher-
ent factor of instability in China’s real es-
tate market threatens socio-economic sus-
tainability.
Standardize assignment  
of administrative authority vis-a-vis 
expenditure responsibilities
Assignment of administrative au-
thority must be stable and adjusted on a 
dynamic basis. Proper assignment of ad-
ministrative authority vis-a-vis expendi-
ture responsibilities requires the govern-
ment to transform its functions, which is 
an ongoing process. So far, progress has 
already been made in this area and the 
concept of streamlining government ad-
ministration and delegating power is well 
received. Assignment of administrative 
authority vis-a-vis expenditure responsi-
bilities should be adjusted on a dynamic 
basis in sync with this process and chang-
ing realities. With the wax and wane of 
industries and technologies and the dy-
namics of social progress, demand for 
public services keeps changing and must 
be reflected in the assignment of adminis-
trative authority and expenditure respon-
sibilities. New public services and affairs, 
which are complicated and take time to 
discern, must be classified into different 
categories of administrative authority for 
different levels of government.
Assignment of administrative author-
ity and expenditure responsibilities is not 
just a fiscal issue. It relates to the reform of 
the administrative and even the political 
system. At the fundamental level, this im-
portant matter must only be resolved by 
law. In the past, regions with fast-growing 
or strong fiscal revenues were tasked with 
additional administrative responsibilities, 
which is justified yet caused negative in-
centives at the local level. Legislation is 
the most powerful instrument to ensure 
the stable and predictable assignment of 
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administrative authority and expenditure 
responsibilities. Despite adaptability to 
changing social conditions, the hierarchy 
of the current legislation is insufficient to 
guarantee such stability and predictabil-
ity. Thus, conditions must be created to 
formalize the assignment of administra-
tive authority and expenditure respon-
sibilities by law at a higher hierarchy to 
reduce artificial adjustments. An ideal ap-
proach is to formalize the assignment of 
administrative authority and expenditure 
responsibilities in line with the Constitu-
tion. China must accelerate its develop-
ment of the rule of law to ensure such sta-
bility and predictability.
Common administrative authority 
needs to be further specified. The assign-
ment of administrative authority and ex-
penditure responsibilities is a systematic 
project. The Guiding Opinions of the State 
Council on Reforming Central-Local Fiscal 
Authority and Expenditure Responsibilities 
released in August 2016 marks a good 
beginning but still focuses on the assign-
ment of “fiscal administrative authority”. 
Based on whether or not the government 
invests, administrative authority can be 
categorized into fiscal authority and non-
fiscal authority. For most undertakings, 
the government should mobilize private 
resources rather than devote its own fi-
nancial resources. According to the Opin-
ions, China should create more common 
fiscal responsibilities compared with so-
phisticated market economies. However, 
the overlap of central-local responsibili-
ties contributes to confusion and evasion 
of responsibilities. While such overlap is 
unavoidable, the key is to create incen-
tives to maximize the enthusiasm of both 
central and local governments.
For instance, local governments in 
some western regions in China that suf-
fer a brain drain argue that compulsory 
education should be funded by the cen-
tral government. But actually compulsory 
education has a strong positive spillover 
effect that also brings about local bene-
fits. Compulsory education promotes the 
equalization of local income distribution, 
social benefits and local welfare. In addi-
tion, given their understanding of local 
realities, it is more appropriate for local 
governments to provide compulsory edu-
cation services. This is why a special pre-
mium is put on local responsibilities when 
it comes to compulsory education in major 
countries across the world. It is not easy 
to define the fiscal authority and expendi-
ture responsibilities of the central govern-
ment. Nevertheless, arguments over this 
question cannot diminish the importance 
of compulsory education.
Another prominent question is basic 
pension services. In reality, some local 
governments have already encountered 
difficulties of basic pension payment. Yet 
diverting pension resources across re-
gions may cause more regions to experi-
ence pension payment difficulties. Under 
the current system, local governments 
should try to overcome the difficulties 
on their own before resorting to central 
fiscal assistance. Given China’s unified 
labor market, a basic pension system re-
quires national pooling. Yet such pool-
ing should put more emphasis on central 
government responsibilities. A reason-
able approach is to divert fiscal resources 
from elsewhere to help localities with ba-
sic pension payment difficulties. Never-
theless, it is by no means easy for central 
and local governments to determine their 
respective responsibilities on basic pen-
sion security.
Respect the role of local government 
initiative. Incentives must be created for 
local governments in reforming the as-
signment of administrative authority and 
expenditure responsibilities. The key is to 
bring local initiative into play.
Given China’s reality, it is justified for 
the central government to determine fiscal 
authority and the assignment of central-
local fiscal powers. However, arrange-
ments must be in place to incentivize local 
governments. Legislation should take into 
full account the role of local governments. 
The central government must collect feed-
back from localities before making a deci-
sion. Given the great regional differences 
in China, systems inconsistent with local 
realities will not work. Legislation must 
respect local situations to achieve the ex-
pected outcome.
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Performance of administrative au-
thority at the local level must be assured 
by fiscal power and resources. It is chal-
lenging yet necessary for local govern-
ments to provide a wide range of public 
services. In a transition society fraught 
with contradictions, public security con-
cerns and other problems are not caused 
by a particular locality in isolation. Lo-
cal authorities must be empowered with 
the necessary fiscal power and resources 
in order to perform their responsibili-
ties. It is also challenging to ensure that 
localities with different conditions are 
endowed with sufficient fiscal power 
and resources under a unitary system. 
It is important that administrative au-
thority and expenditure responsibilities 
be divided clearly between central and 
provincial governments to make it easier 
for the rights and responsibilities to be 
assigned to localities below the provin-
cial level. In making this assignment, 
the “one-size-fits-all” approach must be 
avoided. Localities should be encour-
aged to explore systems consistent with 
their realities.
Standardize government revenue 
allocation
Create a comprehensive payment 
and revenue allocation system. In 1994, 
the allocation of fiscal revenues mainly 
involved taxation. Yet under integrity 
considerations, the scope of revenue allo-
cation should also include the rent income 
of state-owned resources, revenues from 
state-owned land, government funds, 
profits from the operation of state-owned 
capital, etc. For revenues not included 
under the framework of the tax sharing 
reform in 1994, any attempt to share them 
will be inevitably resisted by their exist-
ing owners. In overcoming vested inter-
ests, China must expedite government 
reforms and make government budget 
and final accounts even more transpar-
ent. Similar to taxation, the threshold for 
creating administrative fees and govern-
ment funds must be raised substantially. 
The ultimate goal is to create a system of 
government revenue allocations encom-
passing taxation, rents and profits.
Given the lion’s share of taxation in 
government revenue, the key to revenue 
allocation is to form a reasonable local 
tax system. Currently, local fiscal expen-
ditures are primarily funded by local tax 
revenues. Hence, central tax and shared 
tax should be the priorities for the reform 
of government revenue allocation.
Increased share of local governments 
in VAT distribution is justified. With 
the pilot implementation of the reform 
of replacing business tax with VAT, VAT 
revenues are distributed equally between 
central and local governments. An in-
creased share of VAT distribution is jus-
tified because it will compensate for the 
reduction of local revenues after tax sys-
tem standardization and strengthen local 
fiscal resources. Some argue that a higher 
share in VAT distribution will induce mis-
conduct by local governments. This paper 
believes that this view is unfounded. First, 
the equal distribution of VAT revenues is 
a temporary measure to make up for lo-
cal fiscal deficiency without business tax. 
Adequate tax revenues are essential for lo-
cal governments to function properly. Sec-
ond, the so-called misconduct has more 
to do with market distortions caused by 
government, which should be addressed 
by rationalizing the relationship between 
government and market. A higher share 
in revenue distribution in favor of local 
governments will not lead to misconduct 
as long as proper relations with the mar-
ket are formalized.
Revamp consumption tax into a cen-
tral-local shared tax. Under the current 
system, consumption tax is, in theory, a 
central tax. Yet in reality, consumption 
tax revenues are subject to rebate and not 
purely a central tax. After the tax-for-fee 
reform for finished oil products, the ma-
jority of consumption tax converted from 
road toll is returned to local governments 
and the nature of consumption tax as a 
shared tax became evident. The tax shar-
ing scheme can be designed according to 
the types or total revenues of consump-
tion tax. While the former caters to dif-
ferent types of local taxation, the latter 
corresponds to the overall adjustment of 
fiscal power and resources. Currently, 
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consumption tax is primarily levied on 
manufacturing and wholesale activities. 
This paper suggests that consumption 
tax also be levied on retail business and 
defined as local tax revenue, thus incen-
tivizing local governments to encourage 
consumption. The question is the feasi-
bility of collecting consumption tax from 
retail business. Considering the significant 
share of tobacco and alcohol in consump-
tion tax, revenue disparities may expand 
across regions and not all regions may 
benefit. But if this plan is adopted, the 
share of VAT for local governments can 
be somewhat reduced.
Reform of property tax and land rev-
enue system. Foreseeably, the significance 
of property tax to local tax revenue will 
continue to rise. The imposition of proper-
ty tax on households is intended to move 
the tax burden from purchase to posses-
sion. In China, the possession of real prop-
erty is almost tax-free. Yet homeowners 
have to pay various taxes and fees for the 
development and purchase of commercial 
housing. Increasing the tax burden on the 
possession of real property will only ag-
gravate their tax misery and reduce pub-
lic welfare4. Compared with countries of 
private land ownership, the property tax 
rates should be much lower in China. In 
addition, in view of China’s skyrocketing 
housing prices, households may not be 
able to afford to pay property tax even if 
it is introduced5.
Local Governments should be en-
dowed with certain taxing authority, 
including legislation and tax rate ad-
justment. There are some mispercep-
tions about the concept of unitary states. 
In fact, the tendencies of centralization 
and decentralization of power for unitary 
and federalist states have been constantly 
changing. While unitary states decentral-
ize, federalist states centralize. The argu-
ment that unitary states cannot decentral-
ize taxing authority is unfounded. Indeed, 
4 Car parking charges in cities may also be-
come a major source of revenue for local govern-
ments.
5 This is also the reason why property tax 
cannot become a major source of local tax rev-
enues in China in the short term.
in some small unitary states, local tax 
revenues account for a minor share. How-
ever, this cannot be used as the basis to ar-
gue against the creation and improvement 
of China’s local tax system. As a large 
country, China’s optimal intergovern-
mental fiscal relations must be fine-tuned 
and optimized on a constant basis. Once 
property tax is fully rolled out, unless lo-
cal governments have the authority to ad-
just the tax rates, their efforts to improve 
public services may lead to housing price 
hikes and a higher property tax burden 
for households6. Of course, granting cer-
tain taxing authority to local governments 
does not inhibit formation of a unified na-
tional market.
Standardization of government rev-
enue allocation naturally involves the is-
sue of debt financing. Local government 
financing involves particularly compli-
cated questions. In general, local govern-
ment expenditure must be funded by tax 
revenues rather than debts. The debt issu-
ing authority of local governments under 
a hierarchical fiscal system does not mean 
that liabilities can be a major source of 
local fiscal resources7. Unchecked financ-
ing from public property rights will jeop-
ardize local government sustainability. 
In fact, financing from public property 
rights is to blame for China’s addiction to 
land sales. From the perspective of socio-
economic sustainability, financing from 
public property rights must be conducted 
with great caution.
Standardization  
of fiscal transfer payment
Cancel tax rebates. Undeniably, tax 
rebates played a positive role in facilitat-
6 For instance, after a subway line is put 
into operation, adjacent land value will increase. 
However, if local governments are not able to ad-
just the tax rates, the burden of property tax for 
homeowners will rise as well. As a result, the sub-
way that is intended to improve people’s welfare 
actually increases their burden. If the tax power is 
attributed to local governments, tax rates can be 
lowered at the local level to ease the increased tax 
burden in case housing prices increase.
7 Tremendous local liabilities must be re-
solved through special one-time solutions and 
will not be elaborated on in this paper.
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ing China’s tax sharing reform. Without 
tax rebates, it was impossible for the tax 
sharing reform to be carried out in the first 
place. However, while creating incentives 
for prosperous regions, tax rebates caused 
a massive flow of funds to developed re-
gions, widened regional fiscal disparities 
and compromised the equalization of 
public services. Tax rebates have been in 
existence for more than two decades and 
transfer payments have yet to standard-
ize. Obsolete arrangements such as tax 
rebates and revenues submission (allow-
ance) need to be phased out. Despite the 
declining share of tax rebates in the trans-
fer payment system, their absolute size 
remains significant. China must phase out 
tax rebates to enhance the tax sharing sys-
tem. To avoid causing major impacts to lo-
cal fiscal power, tax rebates should be re-
organized into general transfer payments.
Create an integrated vertical and 
horizontal transfer payment system. 
Transfer payments include various pat-
terns such as vertical, horizontal and hy-
brid transfer payments. Under the vertical 
model, transfer payments take place be-
tween central and local governments. Un-
der the horizontal model, they take place 
between local governments. A hybrid 
model features both characteristics. China 
currently practices a vertical transfer pay-
ment system.
Partner assistance exists across vari-
ous parts of China. Partner assistance and 
economic cooperation are some of the key 
features of China’s institutional advan-
tage. They promote socio-economic devel-
opment in less developed regions through 
targeted assistance. In China, 19 provinces 
and municipalities are involved in partner 
assistance to Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
Region; 17 provinces and municipalities 
are involved in partner assistance to Tibet 
Autonomous Region. For instance, Beijing 
provides partner assistance to Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Qinghai, Badong County of Hubei 
Province, and Shifang City of Sichuan 
Province. In addition, other partner assis-
tance programs also exist, including assis-
tance to Qinghai. 
Regional cooperation and relief may 
also take the form of economic coopera-
tion. Regional cooperation schemes in-
clude Beijing-Tianjin, Beijing-Hebei, Bei-
jing-Shanxi and Beijing-Inner Mongolia 
cooperation. Relief and coordination pro-
grams include Chifeng and Ulanqab as-
sistance programs and south-north water 
diversion project coordination8. 
Partner assistance and economic co-
operation must be supported by sufficient 
fiscal funds. Supporting regions have to 
use local fiscal resources to assist less de-
veloped regions. This system is actually a 
horizontal transfer payment system and 
must be formalized. For recipient regions, 
coordination with the vertical transfer sys-
tem is also an issue. Optimizing the verti-
cal transfer system also requires a proper 
linkage between partner assistance and 
economic cooperation.
In providing partner assistance using 
local fiscal resources, local governments 
actually perform the responsibility of pub-
lic service equalization, which otherwise 
should be assumed by the central govern-
ment. Hence, horizontal and vertical trans-
fer payment systems should be brought 
into overall consideration. Theoretically 
speaking, the objectives of horizontal 
transfer payments may also be achieved 
through vertical transfer payments. How-
ever, horizontal transfer payments must 
be formalized in order to increase the ef-
ficiency and scale of assistance.
In vertical transfer payments, this pa-
per suggests that funds be allocated di-
rectly to county governments to alleviate 
the dearth of fiscal resources at the grass-
roots level. The amount of vertical transfer 
payments should be determined accord-
ing to the number and size of central gov-
ernment projects at the local level. These 
projects will boost local fiscal resources. 
Their effect on local economic growth 
needs to be further evaluated.
Reduce the scale of transfer pay-
ments. Central government boasts the 
advantage of economies of scale in raising 
fiscal revenues. For many local govern-
ments, their fiscal revenues are dwarfed 
by expenditure and must be supplement-
8 See Beijing Partner Assistance and Econom-
ic Cooperation Network (Available at: http://
www.bjzyhzb.cn/dkzy/ybgz/).
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ed by transfer payments. Through trans-
fer payments, the central government may 
also enhance its control on local govern-
ments. Given the various costs of fiscal 
fund transfer, a desirable approach is to 
reduce the scale of transfer payments as 
much as possible.
The magnitude of transfer payments 
is subject to many factors. While current 
transfer payments aim to satisfy public 
budget, the amount of future transfer pay-
ments must be determined in light of other 
fiscal resources at the disposal of govern-
ment. In determining the size of transfer 
payments, one question must be properly 
addressed: Should China adopt a central-
ized transfer payment system or a decen-
tralized one? While centralized transfer 
payments afford the central government 
enhanced regulatory capacity, they do not 
help in increasing the enthusiasm of local 
governments. The opposite is true for a 
decentralized transfer payment system. In 
addition, a significant amount of transfer 
payments is more likely to be mobilized 
under a centralized system than a de-
centralized one. There might be a certain 
extent of equivalence in the choice of cen-
tralized, decentralized or hybrid transfer 
payment systems but the key is to identify 
a system of compatible incentives.
Reshape general and special trans-
fer payments. General transfer payments 
are determined by estimating the gap 
between standard income and standard 
expenditure with consideration of the fis-
cal resources factor. General transfer pay-
ments entail certain negative incentives 
and currently only apply to balancing 
transfer payments. Therefore, the gen-
eral transfer payment system must be im-
proved by incorporating more incentives 
in the estimation of standard income and 
take into account more fiscal endeavors to 
reduce the negative impacts.
Special transfer payments have clear 
payment policy objectives but the deci-
sion-making process should be open and 
transparent. In addition, a certain extent 
of competition should be introduced. 
There are many pathways to achieve poli-
cy objectives. Conditions must be created 
for local governments to compete for such 
funds to minimize the cost for achieving 
policy targets.
General transfer payments are, at the 
very least, no less efficient than special 
transfer payments. In this sense, special 
transfer payments should be reduced 
as much as possible. Provided that local 
governments are able to allocate trans-
fer payment funds, general transfer pay-
ments would be more advisable. If the 
objective of the central government is to 
raise the level of a certain type of public 
service nationwide, special transfer pay-
ments would be more appropriate. The 
level of local government budget restraint 
also affects the choice of transfer payment 
method. Insufficient restraint may cause 
the funds to be allocated to inefficient 
projects, thus affecting the achievement of 
transfer payment objectives.
Special transfer payments may address 
many problems that cannot be addressed 
by general transfer payments, particularly 
the improvement of certain basic public 
services such as compulsory education and 
health care. Transfer payments should also 
be determined according to the different 
positioning of main function zones with 
corresponding standard income and ex-
penditure. With environmental restoration 
and maintenance responsibilities, regions 
restricted or prohibited for development 
must pay a higher price of environmental 
protection for the development of main 
function zones.
China’s special transfer payment items 
are complicated, myriad and overlapping. 
Use of funds is scattered and some projects 
are designed in disregard of local realities. 
These items must be classified and rear-
ranged for better management to serve the 
role that cannot be played by other forms 
of transfer payments in the improvement 
of basic public services.
Existing central fiscal transfer pay-
ments excessively require local matching 
funds. As a result, some localities that can-
not provide sufficient matching funds fail 
to receive transfer payments despite their 
desperate need for support. Sometimes, 
these localities are forced to resort to data 
fraud, which affects the achievement of 
objectives for special transfer payments. 
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Hence, the requirement of local matching 
funds must be abandoned in some cir-
cumstances.
As local fiscal management is gov-
erned by more restraint in the future, spe-
cial transfer payments can be downsized. 
China’s current tax rebate and balancing 
transfer payments fall in the category of 
unconditional transfer payments. In the 
future, these different forms of transfer 
payments must be integrated to fashion a 
unified general transfer payment system 
where the amount of transfer payments is 
determined according to the difference be-
tween local income and expenditure.
Create a standardized fiscal transfer 
payment system. So far, intergovernmen-
tal transfer payments in China are not 
formalized and often conducted through 
various “circulars” and “decisions” of the 
central government. This affects not only 
the formation of reasonable expectations 
at the local level but the standardization of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations as well.
Currently, the creation of an insti-
tutional framework for China’s transfer 
payments must be backed by legisla-
tion and long-term strategic planning 
to make transfer payments predictable. 
A timetable for reform should be speci-
fied to create stable expectations for local 
governments. For instance, the amount 
of transfer payments should be adjusted 
with an interval of five years. Explicit re-
quirements are much more positive than 
ad hoc regulations.
China may also consider establishing 
an intergovernmental transfer payment 
council to increase the transparency of 
central fiscal transfer payments, incen-
tivize local governments, and properly 
balance central-local fiscal relations. The 
council should be responsible for evalu-
ating the transfer payment plan submit-
ted by the central fiscal appropriation 
expert committee and submit the plan 
to China’s legislature for review and ap-
proval.
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